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Environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing is gaining popularity in 
the finance sector by incorporating positive social impact and quantitative and qualitative 
risk factors. Investors using ESG strategies are assessing the impact of this shift on 
portfolio returns, and governments are regulating ESG data reporting. This study builds 
on prior research to (1) determine the impact of government reporting standards on ESG 
investment outcomes and long-term returns of portfolios and (2) address changes in the 
returns of ESG-focused investment strategies using the largest French companies before 
and after the implementation of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act, a 2016 
French law impacting ESG reporting standards. The results outline differences in returns 
between high and low-scoring ESG portfolios in France and changes in these portfolios 
before and after the regulation passed. The report concludes that France’s regulation 
increased average ESG scores but did not have a statistically significant impact on the 
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Environmental, social and governance (ESG) focused investing is changing the 
way consumers and investors analyze companies and quantify impact. Driven by 
consumer demand for investment portfolios that provide both positive social impact and 
adequate financial performance (Bannier, Bofinger, & Rock, 2019), investment managers 
adopted ESG factors into their strategic practices. ESG scoring emerged to help investors 
analyze a company’s social impact. Data providers use indicators such as carbon 
emissions, diversity statistics and worker’s rights to produce these scores (Huber, 
Comstock, & Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2017). The subjective nature of ESG 
indicators results in a lack of standardized methodology and complicated variables that 
are difficult to uniformly measure. The introduction of ESG scores in investment 
decisions necessitates a regulation system.  
The debate over the effectiveness of using ESG data as a driver of investment 
decisions increases demand for a relevant regulation system. While some researchers 
claim ESG investing could drive positive long-term financial performance (Friede, G., 
Busch, T., & Bassen, 2015), others are less optimistic about the use of ESG metrics as a 
factor in portfolios (Auer and Schuhmacher 2016). The debate over the effectiveness of 
ESG investing prompted much of the research done in the industry; however, the lack of 
consistent ESG data increases the confusion as to the effectiveness of ESG strategies and 
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causing investors to struggle to produce the most financially and socially efficient 
outcomes. 
As it becomes clear that current ESG data providers may front underlying 
inefficiencies, developed countries, particularly in the European Union and the United 
States, are considering implementing government reporting standards for ESG metrics. 
Regardless of its specific reporting standards, these laws raise awareness and scrutiny of 
ESG behavior within companies. Many countries acknowledge the benefits of ESG 
reporting standards, but few governing bodies implemented these standards as thoroughly 
as France. France publicized the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act early in 2015 
and the legislation gained momentum at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
conference, leading to global attention (Balibar 2017).   
 A notable and unique section of this law is Article 173-VI, a comply or explain 
government policy passed in 2015 as part of the Energy Transition for Green Growth 
Act. This article of the law requires institutional investors to report specific ESG metrics 
of their portfolio management and validates them along set criteria (Evain, Cardona, & 
Nicol, 2018). Article 173-VI is the first set of legislation to directly address ESG metrics 
within investing. By setting standards for investors to publicize their ESG activities, 
Article 173-VI both increased awareness of ESG practices within French businesses and 
pressured French investors and companies to publicize and incorporate ESG metrics into 
regular business activities. A 2017 study of Article 173-VI reporting companies in France 
found that 91% of investors incorporated ESG factors into their investment strategies. Of 
these, 52% used France’s Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) label as an indicator 
while 22% used the Energy and Ecological Transition for the Climate (EETC) label 
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(Delérable, Gazzo, & Perez, 2017). These reports investigated the participation by ESG-
focused companies in France following Article 173-VI’s implementation, but data is 
lacking on the correlation between these reporting standards and the financial 
performance of these investment strategies. 
Addressing the impact of policy implementation, my research explores the 
following question: is there a difference in the financial performance of ESG-focused 
public companies in French markets before and after Article 173-VI was passed?  
Research on this topic can guide policy in countries seeking to implement similar ESG 
reporting controls by evaluating the financial performance of companies in France before 
and after policy implementation. This research can be expanded to aid governments in 

































Environmental, social and governance (ESG) focused investing is disrupting the 
financial industry through its cascading effects on management and investment 
decisions1. ESG investing, a strategic investment approach combining traditional 
financial performance and non-financial data, is the financial industry’s response to 
increased consumer demand for positive social impact in developed markets. The 
majority of millennials, the generation representing a new wave of investors, are 
concerned with their social impact (Klober, 2015) and the concept of ESG-based 
portfolios offers investors both desired positive social effects and adequate financial 
performance to sustain such investments. These strategies are rapidly gaining popularity, 
with socially responsible investments (SRIs) making up approximately a quarter of US 
investments and half of European investments in 2019 (Bannier, Bofinger, & Rock, 
2019). In addition to conventional tracking of financial performance to establish 
investment strategy, ESG investors use ESG scores as a factor to construct portfolios for 
their clients. These scores are assigned to individual companies and industries, using data 
 
1 ESG investing is a term increasing in popularity within financial literature. It is often interchangeable 
with the terms socially responsible investing (SRI) and impact investing and will be treated as such in this 
paper (Boerner, 2012) 
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such as carbon emissions, diversity and worker’s rights to rate potential attractiveness 
(Huber, Comstock, & Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2017)2.  
While certain ESG scoring factors such as diversity statistics and employee pay 
are evaluated on a standardized basis, many require analysis subject to interpretation by 
individual investment professionals or firms. Research within ESG is in the relatively 
early stages, leading to emerging errors in research, lack of standardized methodology 
and complicated variables that are difficult, if not impossible, to uniformly measure.  
The introduction of ESG scores in investment decisions necessitates a regulation 
system. As it becomes clear that a seemingly harmless trend may front underlying 
inefficiencies, developed countries, particularly in the European Union and the United 
States, consider implementing government reporting standards to standardize factors 
affecting ESG scores. The European Union is leading this trend with the United Nations’ 
Global Compact. This law encourages, but does not require, government-regulated 
reporting by public companies and provides access to uniform ESG data sources (Ortas, 
Garayar & Álvarez, 2015).   
France leads ESG regulation trends through Article 173-VI, a unique comply or 
explain government policy passed in 2015 as part of the Energy Transition for Green 
Growth law (Giamporcaro, Gond, & O’Sullivan, 2019). This law builds upon the UN’s 
Global Compact with additional reporting standards for public French companies and 
investors. Article 173-VI, among the first of its kind to establish a standardized reporting 
 
2 These three categories of data points are universally recognized and included across ESG leaders, 
however there are many factors that vary and will be discussed in later sections (Huber, Comstock, & Davis 
Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2017). 
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system, is designed to encourage reporting of ESG practices by public companies and 
implementation of ESG investing by investment institutions.  
 
Defining ESG investing 
 
Once a niche subject area for socially conscious extremists, ESG investing is 
quickly moving into mainstream space, consequently altering key drivers among 
participants (Jemel-Fornetty, H., Louche, C., & Bourghelle, D., 2011). According to 
research done in 2011, this shift primarily indicates that, compared to pioneer 
movements, ESG strategies today revolve around business outcomes as opposed to 
ethical considerations. Investors are not solely focused on the positive social outcomes of 
their portfolios, but on maximizing the cross-section between customer demand and 
financial return. Qualitative research on the goals of ESG-focused companies concludes 
that this shift from ethics-based practices to a focus on financial performance within 
ethics is weakening ESG investing’s positive social impact (Revelli, 2017). 
The argument of business-driven versus ethics-driven approaches to ESG legal 
standards is an important consideration as more countries move towards implementation. 
Ideally, future ESG investment reporting will provide transparent, uniform data that 
encourages positive social externalities from public companies and financially satisfies 
investors. The need for regulation sparks debates on the success of various control 
measures used to encourage ESG reporting necessary for informed investing. As 
countries led by France move towards implementing reporting laws for investment 
institutions, countries such as the United States are deviating from governed reporting 
(Giamporcaro, Gond, & O’Sullivan, 2019).  
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Research evaluating the financial effects of ESG-focused policies is necessary to 
identify the most productive method for encouraging valid ESG investment. My research 
combines analysis of government regulation and ESG-focused portfolio returns to 
identify tangible financial effects of regulation for investors. Specifically, my data 
focuses on how the introduction of France’s Article 173-VI affected financial returns 
from public ESG-focused companies. Interpreting the results of my research requires an 
understanding of financial and regulatory studies on ESG investing and the implications 
for future government intervention. This literature review analyzes previous research 
debating ESG scoring mechanisms, measuring the effects of government regulation, and 
quantifying ESG’s financial impact for investors. 
 
Quantifying and standardizing ESG scores 
 
Standardizing reported scores and producing useful numerical outputs emerged as 
a heavily debated topic due to varying definitions of ESG factors among professionals 
and governing bodies as well as a lack of uniformity within ESG data organization 
(Eccles & Stroehle, 2018). Although consumers and investment managers using ESG 
portfolios strategize according to reported scores, the variations in scores based on the 
provider results in mixed outcomes. Further complicating the ESG scoring process, ESG 
data and reporting became a market itself, subject to the nuances of consumer demand, 
profit-focused management and political intrusion. While many companies attempted to 
enter this market, a few prominent firms dominate market share (Huber, Comstock, and 
Polk, 2017). This section provides an overview of key players in the market for reporting 
data and the effectiveness of current scoring methods. 
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ESG reporting companies use widely varying data points and rating systems to 
construct their overall ESG scores as evidenced in a report by Harvard's Huber, 
Comstock, and Polk (2017). Several key players shape the market for reporting data, 
namely Bloomberg ESG Data Services, DowJones Sustainability Index, MSCI ESG 
Research and Sustainalytics Company ESG Reports.  
The Harvard report analyzed these data providers on a range of factors but the 
most relevant are methodology and rating scale. Methodology outlines how each provider 
evaluates companies and rating scale refers to the scoring system used (Huber, Comstock, 
and Polk, 2017). Excepting MSCI's letter rating system, all of the major providers used 
ratings scales out of 100. This finding provides a certain level of uniformity that indicates 
future adoption of this rating system across providers. Methodology showed diversity 
across the board. Although all providers pull ESG data from similar government and 
company documents, Huber, Comstock, and Polk found that each provider uses a distinct 
classification and weighting system. A 2015 study by Dorfleitner, Halbritter, and Nguyen 
had similar conclusions. These unique methodologies concur with skepticism 
surrounding ESG scoring principles and implies the need for increased regulation to 
validate the data.  
In addition to the validity of ESG scores, critics often question how accurately 
these scores measure actual social impact, prompting research on the correlation between 
the two. Studies done on major players in the market challenge their scoring methods, 
often highlighting inefficiencies. Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) investigated MSCI 
scores and their correlation with each company's actual social impact. For example, the 
authors looked at correlations between KLD environmental scores and pollution 
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emissions. The authors found that KLD scores did not correlate with a more positive 
social impact. Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel credited KLD’s failure to weigh historical 
social impact as a major fault. Historical social impact was found to be a higher predictor 
of a company’s current social impact than company-reported practices and spending 
(Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009). This study, while older than others I examined, is one 
of the first to question the validity of ESG scoring and its accuracy. The factors MSCI 
used to measure ESG in 2009 were consistent with the reported methodology from 
Huber, Comstock, and Polk (2017), so these findings remain relevant.  
Eccles and Stroehle (2018) conducted a similar and wider analysis of major ESG 
data providers, concluding that ESG scores more directly correlate with the values of the 
data provider than the companies being scored. The author’s conclusions tie back to the 
origin of discrepancies found in methodology studies. The lack of enforced regulation 
subjects ESG data to the agenda of providers instead of universally progressive ESG 
indicators. Within a subjective field such as ESG scoring, these inefficiencies negatively 
impact ESG investing’s overall social impact (Eccles & Stroehle, 2018). 
 
Government intervention in sustainability practices 
 
As researchers continually identify ESG reporting inefficiencies, the need for 
government intervention in these practices became clear. The United Nation's Global 
Compact and France's Article 173-VI approach the concept of intervention, but investors 
across the globe are hesitant to comply with stricter regulations (Giamporcaro, Gond & 
O'Sullivan, 2019). Research outlining the effectiveness of past government intervention 
in sustainability practices offers a clearer path for ESG regulation as it becomes a 
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prevalent topic of discussion. This section documents proven methods of government 
intervention in data reporting and historical government intervention trends in the French 
market, including initial findings from the implementation of Article 173-VI. 
Several schools of thoughts exist relating to the logistics of government 
intervention within financial reporting. According to a historical analysis by 
Giamporcaro, Gond and O'Sullivan (2019), the two main considerations for intervention 
in developed countries involve either ‘layering’ increasingly aggressive standardization 
measures over time or implementing strict standardized reporting laws. The authors 
found that, historically, both approaches produce positive results. This research provides 
clarity for proven techniques when implementing initial reporting laws. 
Both of these standardization measures require agreement on the definition of 
collective ESG factors. Although some researchers argue that subjective ESG measures 
are impossible to define under the law, Sitkoff (2018) challenges this with his study 
relating ESG investing to the fiduciary duty law. Sitkoff (2018) looks at ESG investing as 
a legal construct, showing how standardization implementations could impact the way 
ESG investments are managed. Under the fiduciary duty law, investors are required to 
make decisions in the best interest of their clients. There are debates as to whether ethical 
considerations should be taken into account or if these are subject to individual 
discernment (Sitkoff, 2018). Sitkoff found that, while ESG factors cannot currently be 
taken as a standard for 'best interest,’ the risk-adjusted returns and direct benefit of using 
ESG criteria are often beneficial for the recipient. Therefore, this study indicates that 
legally defining measures can be based on or incorporated into the fiduciary law. 
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Critics of government regulation voice concerns that reporting standards 
encourage companies to find loopholes for compliance with reporting standards, thus 
counteracting the positive impact of ESG factors. Revelli (2017) theorized that 
government standards could exacerbate the negative effects of 'mainstreaming' ESG. 
Revelli's paper implies danger in continuing to spread ESG investment strategies among 
investment professionals. This opposing viewpoint examines the precautions that should 
be taken into account when implementing any reporting standards. It also forecasts 
potential causes of negative impacts, an important factor when examining the 
effectiveness of reporting standards.  
Within the progressive French SRI market, Crifo and Mottis (2013) found that 
increased legislation involving SRI reporting standards led to an increase in ‘the diffusion 
of SRI into French mainstream asset management.’ Their study, analyzing how the 
French SRI market functions in relation to other large players and shows positive 
correlations between reporting standards and reporting standardization improvements. 
The valuable analysis of not only financial performance but the rate of adoption of these 
strategies provides an additional dimension encouraging legal involvement within ESG 
investment markets (Crifo & Mottis, 2013). Article 173-VI falls under SRI 
implementation, indicating positive adoption prospects as the law matures. 
Relating specifically to Article 173-VI, Evain, Cardona and Nicol (2018) looked 
at climate reporting under France’s Article 173 for French insurance companies in the 
second year of the law's implementation. The study found an improvement in the 
standards of reporting but lacked clarity on how positively investors viewed ESG 
strategies (Evain, Cardona, & Nicol, 2018). This study provides one of the first 
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examinations of the impact and implementation of Article 173-VI by examining 
qualitative date on improvements in reporting standards and the ways companies include 
them in business practices. Although this article focuses on insurance companies 
specifically, it includes a cross section between understanding and implementation that 
provides context into the interpretation and practice of the law (Evain, Cardona, & Nicol, 
2018). 
 
ESG’s Financial Impact 
 
The correlation between a company's ESG score and its long-term corporate 
financial performance (CFP) is the most contentious issue among ESG researchers. 
Research on the financial effects of ESG investing is of chief importance among present 
and future ESG investors in light of mixed results. While some investors are willing to 
sacrifice financial performance for greater social impact, positive financial returns remain 
a decisive factor to most consumers and investment managers (Bannier, Bofinger, & 
Rock, 2019). Supporters defend long-term ESG investment approaches by claiming ESG-
focused companies provide long-term stability for both financial and non-financial 
business functions while skeptics argue that increased investment in sustainable practices 
leads to lower returns. Bannier, Bofinger and Rock (2019) found data from these studies 
regularly display conflicting results showing positive, negative and neutral correlations 
between ESG scores and financial returns. As previously mentioned, the lack of 
standardization among scoring systems is a major cause of the variation in correlation 
results. However, the relevance of ESG-CFP correlation means current research on this 
subtopic is comparatively robust and formed patterns of methodology and discussion. 
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Friede, Busch and Bassan (2015) recognized emerging patterns in ESG-CFP 
correlation in an analysis of over two thousand academic studies on the financial impact 
of ESG performance. Attempting to consolidate results from widespread research in this 
field, the authors analyze relevant studies dating from 1970 in both vote-count studies 
and meta-analysis3. The paper recognizes a majority non-negative finding across 
combined studies, adding credence to generalized ESG support. More importantly, the 
authors broke down portfolio and non-portfolio-based methodologies to find a 
statistically significant difference in the results, with portfolio-based research providing a 
lower incidence of positive-trending ESG-CFP correlation. The majority of portfolio-
based analyses produced neutral or mixed results. This study is the first to analyze this 
specific methodology divide and provides important insight. Portfolio-based studies 
include effects of market changes and investment structures that may confound exclusive 
ESG causation but more accurately mimic realistic financial performance (Friede, Busch 
& Bassan, 2015). The effect of these findings hints at ESG as an investment factor 
operating in cohesion with the external economic and management shifts present in 
traditional, non-ESG focused mutual funds. As the largest aggregation of studies in this 
subtopic, these results provide a focused lens for the wider field of studies. 
I identified several notable studies offering a relevant discussion of ESG's 
financial impact on the market and representing the most prominent mixture of results in 
the field. Niche research areas in specific industries and markets reveal patterns that are 
an important part of these discussions however, for the purpose of my research, I chose to 
 
3 Friede, Busch and Bassan use vote-count methods, a simple count of correlational results with less 
sophisticated quantitative effects, to provide a high-level view of their findings. However, their meta-
analysis is far more robust and the authors account for the shortcomings of vote-count results. 
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analyze portfolio-based studies applicable to developed financial markets4 5. In this 
section, I will discuss the importance of results from studies producing non-negative and 
negative correlation between ESG factors and CFP. 
Non-negative correlation 
 
Socially conscious investors eagerly encourage adoption of ESG factors in 
investment decisions by demonstrating a positive correlation between high ESG scores 
and attractive CFP. Neutral or mixed results are often discussed as positive results 
supporting ESG investment practices because of the additional positive externalities 
provided by ESG factors. As evidenced in Friede's report, thousands of studies support 
result in a positive ESG-CFP relationship. Therefore, I have identified only studies with 
particularly strong methodology and perspectives. 
Sherwood and Pollard (2018) establish robust positive ESG-CFP correlations 
using portfolio methodologies and MSCI scores in their seminal research paper. Their 
statistically significant results validate the use of ESG factors as a core consideration in 
investment strategy. The combination of Sherwood and Pollard's well-established 
portfolio approach and ESG metrics makes this publication noteworthy. Toledo and 
Bocatto (2014) added to this argument by identifying ESG levels as a unique risk 
premium. Their study indicated that ‘high-ESG’ firms were valued at 13% higher in 
terms of premia than ‘low-ESG’ firms (Toledo & Bocatto, 2014). By identifying ESG 
 
4 Portfolio-based methodologies are widely respected within financial research. They primarily use Fama-
French factors to obtain financial performance metrics specifically focused on investment returns subject to 
normal market constraints (Fama & French 1992). 
5 Developed markets in the European Union and the United States are most relevant to the focus of my 
research and therefore are most prominent in this discussion. 
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level as a risk premium, Toledo and Bocatto weave ESG scores into results with relevant 
implications for investors. 
Sheridan Titman, a pioneer ESG researcher, provides similar positive results from 
an inverse angle. Cao, Titman, Zhan, and Zhang (2019) identified companies that fail to 
address ESG risks and their long-term stock returns. Titman found that lack of attention 
to or incorporation of ESG priorities into corporate strategy leads to 3.5% lower returns 
when adjusted for risk in the long-run. Unlike other studies, this paper takes the approach 
of examining companies with little focus on ESG investing, adding credence to the 
argument for ESG strategy by proving results from a new lens. By factoring in multiple 
angles and finding clear positive benefits, Titman's study adds validity to the need for 
enforcement of ESG-investment strategies for both socially and financially focused 
initiatives. The findings provide a more holistic view of the argument about the validity 
of ESG investment strategy that is useful when conversing on opposing viewpoints. The 
combination of mixed methodologies and consistently positive results from well-
established authors provides strong data for ESG supporters. 
Negative correlation  
 
Research producing negative correlation between ESG factors and CFP highlight 
a less optimistic view of feasibly integrating social impacts into investment decisions. 
While few recognized studies produce egregiously negative ESG-CFP relationships, all 
negative correlations caution against robust early adoption of ESG-focused investment 
strategies. The lack of standardized data and uncertainty surrounding future regulation 
present risks that could exacerbate negative financial performance. ESG skeptics discuss 
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the pitfalls of basing portfolio strategy primarily on today's ESG scores, particularly as 
reporting standards change in areas exploring government intervention. 
ESG supporters often acknowledge these uncertainties by encouraging 
incremental adoption of ESG strategies based on specific non-financial factors, however 
the advantages of this method are not supported by data. Auer and Schuhmacher (2016) 
analyzed subcategories of ESG-CFP relationships by breaking ESG scores into three 
categories (environmental, social and governance) and using updated Sustainalytics data 
to create subsequent portfolios. Their methodology mirrors that of positively correlated 
ESG-CFP research. The authors found a negative ESG-CFP correlation across all three 
categories in European markets and neutral correlation in the United States and Asia. 
Their results challenge both the general discussion of positive effects of ESG factors and 
arguments for strategizing based on specific factors. Similar studies by Fatemi, Glaum, 
and Keiser (2017) corroborate Auer and Schuhmacher's findings. 
The debate on ESG's financial impact provides insight into the volatility of 
findings on ESG-CFP correlation. For profit-seeking investors, these studies have a large 
impact on their desire to include ESG initiatives in investment decisions. Therefore, 
future research results on ESG portfolio's financial performance provide opportunities to 




Unclear scoring methodologies, the need for government regulation and mixed 
financial performance results within an emerging industry provide increased research 
opportunities exploring interactions between government regulation and CFP within ESG 
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investing. Thorough research on existing laws contributes to progressive policy 
implementation as more countries look to regulate ESG investment reporting. The results 
of relevant research serve as motivation for implementing or amending ESG-focused 
investor reporting policies in developed markets across the world. By evaluating the 
financial performance of companies in a country encouraging ESG investment through 
reporting standards, I can make conclusions that shape policy in other countries seeking 
to implement similar controls. Reports released investigate the participation by 
investment institutions following Article 173-VI’s implementation, but data tying 








































 The following section addresses the data collection and analysis techniques I used 
to assess correlation between government reporting standards, specifically those outlined 
in Article 173-VI of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act, and ESG investment 
strategies in France. To gauge the financial performance of companies based on ESG 
metrics, I use a portfolio-based method to implement popular ESG investment strategies. 
Specific data sets and time periods were chosen to best reflect the effects of the 





To properly conduct a portfolio-based approach, I aggregated annual ESG scores 
and historical stock prices for a specific set of French companies. I collected ESG scores 
and historical stock prices for selected companies using Bloomberg’s ESG dashboard and 
monthly historical adjusted closing prices from Yahoo Finance6. Yahoo Finance provides 
a reputable source for historical stock prices and monthly collection provided a robust 
sample of stock prices that could be annualized. 
 
6 Adjusted stock prices account for various corporate actions such as dividends. 
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I chose Bloomberg’s ESG dashboard as my ESG data source because it has a 
consistent categorization of historical ESG scores that can be used to compare changes 
overtime. Bloomberg’s ESG dashboard provides a range of historical ESG scores from 
the past 12 years, both sourced by Bloomberg and reported by third-party agencies such 
as Sustainalytics. Bloomberg sources their data from public company filings, including 
CSR reports, annual reports, websites and Bloomberg surveys, including requests for data 
(Huber, Comstock 2017). The Bloomberg dashboard provides scores out of 100, making 
this information comparable to other companies and easily digested. Their focus on mid 
to large capitalization companies fits well within my subject range. By staying within a 
single source of ESG scoring, the ESG metrics will be most consistent. I specifically 
focused on the data Bloomberg sourced from Sustainalytics because of Sustainalytics’ 
reputability and consistency as a first-mover as an ESG data provider (Huber, Comstock 
2017). 
Bloomberg and Sustainalytics base ESG scores off a number of metrics, such as 
greenhouse gases per revenue and employee turnover, that are available through public 
company reports and surveys directly affected by the Energy for Green Growth Act7. 
This database also produces individual scores for each category within the broader ESG 
industry. Therefore, each company has an individual environmental, social and 
governance score. Sustainalytics scores specifically take into account disclosure, 
preparedness and controversy surrounding ESG risk and opportunities from each 
individual company. Each company is scored on a scale from 0-100, with 100 being the 
highest score. A company receiving a higher score reported more favorable ESG metrics. 
 
7 See Table 7 in the Appendix for a list of example calculations for each component of the ESG score. 
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These scores are grouped into the following risk categories: negligible (90-100), low (80-
89), medium (70-79), high (60-69) and severe (0-59). Investors have full access to the 
information comprising Bloomberg’s scores and investor attitude towards changes made 
to the information in these reports, specifically regarding ESG scoring metrics, would be 
reflected in the stock market. 
Qualifying Subjects 
 
To create a representative, robust sample with available data, I chose the largest 
public French companies based on performance within stock indexes. The companies 
included in my sample are public French companies that belong to the Société des 
Bourses Françaises 120 Index (SBF 120) stock index and the Cotation Assistée en 
Continu (CAC 40) as of December 31, 2019, screened within the Bloomberg terminal. 
These two indices represent France’s highest performing companies. I chose to focus on 
public companies in these indices because the information on ESG scores are more 
widely available due to enforced standards of reporting, company maturity and consumer 
scrutiny. Additionally, companies within these indices are large enough to balance any 
risk associated with instability prominent in small companies.  
Within the SBF 120 index, I screened each company within Bloomberg and 
Yahoo Finance to assure that enough data was available for both ESG scores and 
historical stock prices. Some companies within the SBF 120 were eliminated due to lack 
of ESG scoring or stock price data. This left 77 companies included in the data pool. All 
40 companies in the current CAC 40 index produced sufficient data and are included in 





The time period I used as the cutoff for pre and post-legislation analysis is limited 
by when Article 173-VI passed. The Energy Transition for Green Growth Act went into 
effect in mid-2015 but Article 173-VI went into effect on January 1, 2016 (Article 173-
VI, 2016). I chose Article 173-VI’s passing as the cutoff date because this specific article 
had the most relevance for investors and the finance industry. Data was collected after the 
law from 2016-2019. After screening ESG data within the Bloomberg terminal, I focused 
on February 1, 2014 as a start date due to poor ESG scoring history before this date. 
Therefore, I used a complete time period of February 1, 2014- December 31, 2019 to 
include three years before the law passed and three year after. The time period from 
February 1, 2014- December 31, 2015 is considered ‘pre-legislation’ while the time 




My research procedure involves collecting ESG scores, company information and 
stock price reports from Bloomberg’s ESG Sustainalytics dashboard. For each of the 77 
French companies selected from the SBF 120 index, I collected an annual ESG score and 
monthly stock prices from February 1, 2014 to December 31, 2019. After gathering 
relevant data points, I grouped the companies based on ESG score, forming three mock 
portfolios for high, mid and low-scoring ESG companies. The portfolio method 
popularized by Fama & French (1992) is a data analysis tool for determining financial 
performance based on specific factors.  For each portfolio within my data set, I calculated 
the average rate of return (r) as seen in Equation 1 below. After completing my 
calculations, I annualized the returns for each portfolio in pre and post-legislation time 
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periods. I then compared these two sets of portfolios, culminating in a final chart tracking 
changes in stock valuation from 2014-2019. 
Following the creation of these three portfolios, I implemented a popular ESG 
strategy of investing ‘long’ in high-scoring ESG companies and ‘short’ in low-scoring 
ESG companies. This created a ‘high-minus-low’ portfolio that subtracted returns from 
the low-scoring portfolio from those of the high-scoring portfolio. I collected monthly 
returns for this portfolio. These returns were annualized based on pre and post-legislation 
time periods. After testing the differences in ESG scores for each company pre and post-
legislation, the sorted companies remained in their respective portfolios and, therefore, 
did not require rebalancing. 
Additionally, I calculated the Sharpe ratio (Equation 2) of the ‘high-minus-low’ 
portfolio to assess the portfolio’s excess returns taking into account the risk-free rate of 
return and standard deviation for the same time period. The risk-free rate of return was 
calculated using the average returns of 10-year French government bonds for each time 
period (France Government Bond 10Y, 2020). Sharpe ratio calculations assume a .99% 
pre-legislation risk free rate of return and a post-legislation risk free rate of return of .6%. 
 Finally, I tested the pre and post-legislation average returns for statistical 
significance using a two sample mean t-test. This test provided evidence required to 
reject or not reject the null hypothesis. In this scenario, the null hypothesis states there is 
no significant difference between average annual returns for the ‘high-minus-low’ 
portfolio for pre and post-legislation returns.  
 To add robustness and eliminate excessive idiosyncratic risk, this procedure was 
repeated step-by-step with two additional filters. The first procedure isolated CAC 40 
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companies from the SBF 120 data set. Following this procedure, the companies were 
broken into three ESG portfolios evaluated by returns year after year, as discussed above. 
The reason for isolating this specific index is to further assess the impact of legislation on 
highly scrutinized firms. By isolating the highest performing companies from the data set, 
I could assess the impact of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act and Article 173-
VI on the largest, most visible firms. Government legislation may have a greater impact 
on the returns for these key companies within the French market. Additionally, should 
these companies’ returns be significantly impacted by this legislation, this finding could 
indicate early adoption success from larger companies within the market. 
The second filter further isolated specific factors within the data set by using only 
the environmental score for CAC 40 companies. Because the Energy Transition for 
Green Growth Act primarily targets environmental metrics for reporting, this filter 
attempts to eliminate and test if targeting legislation disproportionately impacts specific 
factors within the broader ESG industry. Three portfolios were created based on each 
CAC 40 company’s environmental score and follow the same procedure discussed above. 
Equations 
 








x = the investment 
r(x) = average rate of return of x 
R(f) = Risk free rate of return 
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StdDev(x)=The standard deviation of r(x) 
 
The outlined calculations are focused on a portfolio-based financial analysis using 
the principles of Fama-French market and portfolio studies as well as William Sharpe’s 
measure of adjusted risk to produce quantitative measures of ESG changes. The Fama-




The main limitation in my research is the lack of available data. Ideally, I would 
include data for longer time periods and more companies. Due to the recent nature of 
ESG scoring systems, only larger companies are efficiently scored. Therefore, it is not 
currently feasible to produce a larger, more robust data set to analyze. Additionally, 
consistent ESG scores are only available starting in 2014. The short time period and lack 
of data available for more companies limits my ability to analyze the Energy Transition 
for Green Growth Act’s impact on a larger scale. Similarly, the small number of 
companies included in each portfolio limits my ability to balance risk within each 
portfolio. 
 Another limitation is inconsistency in how ESG scores are calculated and the 
analysis of global and national factors affecting various industry stock prices. ESG scores 
are a relatively new concept, taking place mainly within the past 15 years. Due to 
changes in definitions and the bias of company self-reporting, factors used to calculate 
ESG scores may have shifted. Using a consistent source for ESG scores, Bloomberg, 
alleviates some of this volatility. However, the short history of such scoring systems adds 
some level of uncertainty to the validity of the ESG scores used. 
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Finally, the conclusions drawn from my research are limited by extraneous 
factors. The created portfolios are not large enough to eradicate random, unrelated 
variables that may affect certain companies. Any outliers, positive or negative, could 
have a disproportionately large affect on the overall rate of return. I did not identify any 















































This section analyzes and discusses the conclusions from the research I did to 
understand how France’s Energy Transition for Green Growth Act affected portfolio 
performances for ESG investment strategies. The data is divided into three sections, each 
with a different set of companies and focus. Section 1 creates three ESG-based portfolios 
for 77 companies from the Société des Bourses Françaises 120 Index (SBF 120), 
implements a ‘high-minus-low’ investment strategy and discusses the results and 
implications. Section 2 focuses repeats this process for all 40 companies of the Cotation 
Assistée en Continu (CAC 40) to assess the index’s role as a key driver for the French 
ESG market with highly scrutinized companies. Section 3 creates new portfolios from the 
CAC 40 index using only their environmental score from the ESG reports to highlight 
specific factors targeted by the legislation.  
The portfolio method used for each set of analyses follows an investment strategy of 
‘long’ high-scoring ESG portfolios and ‘short’ low-scoring ESG portfolios. To 
implement this investment strategy, I created a ‘high-minus-low’ portfolio for each 
section by subtracting stock returns from the ‘low-scoring’ ESG portfolio from stock 
returns from the ‘high-scoring’ ESG portfolio. These portfolios are further divided into 
pre-legislation (2014-2015) and post-legislation (2016-2019) time periods as noted in the 
 27 
methodology. The overall ‘high-minus-low’ portfolio is analyzed and discussed in these 
two time periods based on the following factors: 
• Average ESG score 
• Annualized returns 
• Sharpe ratio 
• Statistical significance 
 




In this section, I examine the annualized returns of three ESG-based portfolios 
composed of the 77 relevant SBF 120 companies in pre and post-legislation time periods 
to assess the impact of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act on the effectiveness 
of using ESG metrics as a portfolio factor. I aggregated and annualized the company’s 
monthly stock prices from February 2014 through December 2019 as well corresponding 
annual ESG scores. The statistics are summarized both in graphs showing historical 
returns for each portfolio over time and tables summarizing the effectiveness of a ‘high-
minus-low’ investment strategy over time8. The conclusion discusses the results and their 







8 As discussed in the Research methodology section, the composition of each portfolio remains the same 
for pre and post-legislation analysis. For example, portfolios 1.1 and 1.4 are composed of the same 
companies using different time periods.  
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Figure 1: SBF 120 ESG Portfolio Performance (High-Scoring Minus Low-Scoring) 
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Table 1: SBF 120 Portfolios Pre-Legislation Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual ESG Score 
Average Annual Returns 
 
Standard Deviation 




1.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 83.61 8.56% 1.95% 
1.3 Low-Scoring ESG 57.52 13.52% 4.14% 
Overall Portfolio Return of 





Table 2: SBF 120 Post-Legislation Data Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual ESG Score Average Annual Returns Standard Deviation 
1.4: High-Scoring 96.62 14.64% 4.47% 
1.5: Mid-Scoring 86.26 8.89% 2.07% 
1.6: Low-Scoring 58.05 9.44% 3.12% 









Post-legislation annual returns, 5.19%, were higher than pre-legislation annual 
returns, 3.75%. This result was statistically significant at an 80% confidence level with a 
p-value of .11 and a t-stat of 1.62 on a two sample mean test comparing pre and post-
legislation returns. This rejects the null hypothesis that pre and post-legislation returns for 
the ‘high-minus-low’ portfolio is equal with 80% confidence. For this data set, the high-
scoring ESG portfolio outperformed the low-scoring ESG portfolio in the post-legislation 
time period while underperforming the pre-legislation time period.  
The average annual ESG scores of the high, mid and low-scoring portfolios 
placed the average company for each portfolio in the negligible, low and severe risk 
categories respectively for both time periods. The average annual ESG score increased 
during post-legislation for each portfolio. Assuming an average risk-free rate of return of 
.99%, the pre-legislation Sharpe ratio was -.81. Assuming a risk-free return rate of .6%, 
the post-legislation Sharpe ratio was .68.  
The changes in annual ESG scores and annual returns between the two time 
periods offered the most interesting results from this section. While higher confidence 
levels (at least 90%) are generally preferred to conclude statistical significance within 
research and this level of significance is not enough to claim a distinct outcome, the 
lower statistical significance of these annual returns at 80% offers indications for future 
research and a contrast to the other data sets. This outcome suggests that a difference in 
returns for the ‘high-minus-low’ portfolio strategy occurred before and after the 
legislation was passed. While there are many factors to consider for the cause of the 
difference in returns, this result indicates potential for future research opportunities to 
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strengthen these findings by adding more companies or increasing the time period of 
analysis. Additionally, the increase in ESG scores for each portfolio suggests that, on 
average, ESG scores for these 77 companies are improving and can be used to support the 
positive non-financial impact of the law.  
 




 In this section, I isolate the 40 most significant stocks of the stocks analyzed in 
Section 1 to further study the impact of France’s legislation on specific company types. 
Due to their size, performance and visibility as part of the CAC 40 index, the companies 
included in these portfolios are subject to increased scrutiny and this section aims to 
assess if the increased pressure on the largest firms, specifically those that drive the 
French stock market, were subject to a greater difference in returns following the passage 
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Table 3: CAC 40 Pre-Legislation Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual ESG Score Average Annual Returns Standard Deviation 




2.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 88.23 12.35% 4.06% 
2.3: Low-Scoring ESG 66.44 12.47% 3.32% 





Table 4: CAC 40 Post-Legislation Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual ESG Score Average Annual Returns Standard Deviation 




2.5: Mid-Scoring ESG 88.08 8.44% 2.41% 
2.6: Low-Scoring ESG 62.67 11.70% 3.08% 








Post-legislation annual returns, 3.38%, were higher than pre-legislation annual 
returns, -4.13%. This result was not statistically significant with a p-value of .3 and a t-
stat of 1.01 on a two sample mean test comparing pre and post-legislation returns. This 
result does not reject the null hypothesis that pre and post-legislation returns for the 
‘high-minus-low’ portfolio is equal. Similar to Section 1 companies, the high-scoring 
ESG portfolio underperformed in the pre-legislation time period while outperforming in 
the post-legislation time period. 
 The average annual ESG scores of the high, mid and low-scoring portfolios 
placed the average company for each portfolio in the negligible, low and high-risk 
categories respectively for both time periods. The average annual ESG score did not 
increase or decrease during post-legislation to a large extent for each portfolio. Assuming 
an average risk-free rate of return of .99%, the pre-legislation Sharpe ratio was -.55. 
Assuming a risk-free return rate of .6%, the post-legislation Sharpe ratio was .40.  
The lack of statistical significance in this particular data set indicates several key 
takeaways. The largest and most visible companies did not see significant changes in 
annualized returns after the passing of the legislation. There are several possible 
explanations for this. The lack of statistical significance could indicate that the legislation 
had no impact on the financial outcomes of ESG-focused investment strategies and 
therefore this particular government legislation did not produce a more efficient system 
of ESG investing. The lack of statistical significance could also indicate that ESG scoring 
systems were efficient within the market and additional legislation to control such 
systems do not make a significant impact. 
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The second filter for CAC 40 companies further isolated specific factors within 
the data set by using only the environmental score for CAC 40 companies. Because the 
Energy Transition for Green Growth Act primarily targets environmental metrics for 
reporting, this filter attempts to eliminate extraneous factors and test if targeting 
legislation disproportionately impacts specific factors within the broader ESG industry. 
Additionally, environmental factors within the ESG score receive the most attention from 
consumers and investors (see Table 7). This section implements an alternative investment 
strategy of investing based on specific factors within the broader ESG industry. Three 
portfolios were created based on each CAC 40 company’s environmental score and 
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Table 5: CAC 40 Environmental Pre-Legislation Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual Environmental Score 
Average Annual Returns 
 
Standard Deviation 




3.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 81.88 11.33% 2.82% 
3.3 Low-Scoring ESG 61.66 10.13% 5.90% 
Overall Portfolio Return of 




Table 6: CAC 40 Environmental Post-Legislation Annualized Summary 
Portfolio Average Annual Environmental Score 
Average Annual Returns 
 
Standard Deviation 




3.5: Mid-Scoring ESG 81.88 8.58% 4.13% 
3.6 Low-Scoring ESG 61.71 12.69% 2.24% 
Overall Portfolio Return of 









Post-legislation annual returns, -2.19%, were lower than pre-legislation annual 
returns, 2.13%. This result was not statistically significant with a p-value of .5 and a t-stat 
of -.61 on a two sample mean test comparing pre and post-legislation returns. This result 
does not reject the null hypothesis that pre and post-legislation returns for the ‘high-
minus-low’ portfolio is equal. In contrast to the other data sets, the high-scoring portfolio 
outperformed the low-scoring portfolio pre-legislation and underperformed post-
legislation. 
The average annual environmental scores of the high, mid and low-scoring 
portfolios placed the average company for each portfolio in the negligible, low and high-
risk categories respectively for both time periods. The average annual environmental 
score stayed essentially equal during post-legislation for each portfolio. Assuming an 
average risk-free rate of return of .99%, the pre-legislation Sharpe ratio was .19. 
Assuming a risk-free return rate of .6%, the post-legislation Sharpe ratio was -.44.  
The lack of statistical significance and differences from the first two data sets 
indicates that targeted legislation does disproportionately impact certain ESG metrics. 
For countries seeking to efficiently raise returns for ESG investors while regulating the 
scoring system, this particular study does not find significant results. These portfolios 
also produced lower Sharpe ratios than sections 1 and 2, indicating more risk with this 
investment strategy. Therefore, targeting specific metrics or categories may not be a 
suitable investment strategy.  
In contrast to the first two sections, the high-scoring portfolio underperformed in 
post-legislation time period. This could result from several scenarios. One possibility is 
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that increased scrutiny caused by the legislation specifically targeted towards 
environmental metrics prompted increased investment in improving these metrics, 
therefore lowering short-term stock returns. Another possibility is that the alternative 
method of sorting companies for these portfolios displays new groupings compared to the 

























FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 
 Based on the research I conducted on France’s Energy Transition for Green 
Growth Act and its effect on ESG investment strategies, I identified several opportunities 
for future related research, including studies expanding the time period of collected data, 
incorporating a larger sample size of companies and using data from multiple countries.  
 Average ESG scores increased following the implementation of legislation. While 
this study cannot identify causation for these positive changes, further studies could 
attempt to replicate these results in other countries or with a wider set of companies and 
provide stronger support. If legislation correlated with stronger ESG performance, this 
could encourage other countries to increase ESG-related reporting standards and 
legislation. 
As ESG data and scoring systems become increasingly robust and widespread, 
larger samples and expanded time periods for returns will offer opportunities for 
increasingly sound analysis of the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act and Article 
173-VI’s impact. The increased level of statistical significance in a larger sample size 
indicates that adding additional companies and portfolios could produce strong results. 
ESG scores are becoming mainstream and the continuation of scoring systems like 
Sustainalytics and Bloomberg means ESG data will be available for more companies and 
for a longer time period. Future research could expand upon this paper’s findings by 
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adding smaller companies, increasing the data set for SBF 120 and CAC 40 companies, 
and tracking financial changes as ESG systems and popularity evolves. 
 Analyzing ESG portfolio effectiveness in other developed countries with various 
social systems, industries and styles of legislation would add to the overall available 
studies of government intervention on ESG investing. As more laws regulating ESG data 
are implemented and this investment strategy increases in popularity, there will be 
multiple laws in different countries and longer time periods to analyze returns from. This 
allows researchers to compare the effectiveness of various legislation types on ESG 
investment techniques. Additionally, researchers could examine legislation that targets 
specific metrics or factors within the broader ESG category as the Energy Transition for 
Green Growth Act targeting environmental factors. By combining legislation with the 
highest level of financial performance, governments can analyze the most efficient way 

























Table 7: SBF 120 portfolio compositions 
Portfolio 1.1: High-Scoring ESG 1.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 1.3: Low-Scoring ESG 


























BNP Paribas SA 
Orange SA 
Electricite de France SA 
Capgemini SE 
CNP Assurances 







Pernod Ricard SA 
Bureau Veritas SA 












Ingenico Group SA 
Unibail-Rodamco-
Westfield 
LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton SE 
Air Liquide SA 
Cie Generale des 
Etablissements Michelin 
SCA 
Veolia Environnement SA 
Publicis Groupe SA 















Remy Cointreau SA 
Eiffage SA 







Table 8: CAC 40 portfolio composition 
Portfolio 2.1: High-Scoring ESG 2.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 2.3: Low-Scoring ESG 












Schneider Electric SE 
Thales SA 
Danone SA 
BNP Paribas SA 
Orange SA 
Capgemini SE 






Pernod Ricard SA 





LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton SE 
Air Liquide SA 
Cie Generale des 
Etablissements Michelin 
SCA 
Veolia Environnement SA 
Publicis Groupe SA 









Table 9: CAC 40- Environmental portfolio compositions 
Portfolio 3.1: High-Scoring ESG 3.2: Mid-Scoring ESG 3.3: Low-Scoring ESG 













LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton SE 







Air Liquide SA 
Kering SA 
L'Oreal SA 
Credit Agricole SA 
Engie SA 
Publicis Groupe SA 
BNP Paribas SA 
Veolia Environnement SA 
EssilorLuxottica SA 
Vinci SA 














Table 10: Examples of ESG metrics per category 
Category Environmental Social Governance 














Fossil fuel generation 
capacity 
Women employees to 
management ratio 
 
% Women employees 
 
% Employee turnover 
 
% Employees unionized 
 
Total incident rate 
 
Fatalities/1000 employees 
% Independent directors 
 
Director average age 
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